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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Philip Chartock appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence
entered by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on April 6, 2007. 
For the following reasons, this Court will affirm. 
I.
We will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
This case centers around an alleged scheme by Richard Mariano, Philip Chartock,
and other co-defendants to defraud the citizens of Philadelphia of the honest services of
Richard Mariano.  Mariano was a member of the Philadelphia City Council and
represented the Seventh Councilmanic District, which comprises North Philadelphia and
parts of Northeast Philadelphia.  Philip Chartock (and his father Louis Chartock, before
him) owned Erie Steel, Ltd. (“Erie”), a company located within Mariano’s district. 
According to the indictment, Philip Chartock indirectly made three payments to Richard
Mariano in 2002, and Richard Mariano afforded favorable treatment to Erie from at least
2002 to 2005.
The first payment occurred on or about May 10, 2002.  Philip Chartock gave
Mariano a check drawn from Erie’s account in the amount of $5,873.75.  This check was
3not made payable directly to Mariano, but instead was made payable to Fleet Credit Card
Services, so that Mariano could pay his personal credit card bill.  Upon Philip Chartock’s
direction, Erie bookkeeper Maggie Greer classified the check as a sales expense.
Only a few days prior to this payment, officials from the Air Management Services
Division of the City of Philadelphia Department of Public Health (“Air Management”)
attempted to inspect Erie to determine if the company was complying with the City’s air
pollution standards.  Philip Chartock did not consent to the inspection on that day and
called Mariano when the inspectors left.  Mariano immediately called Air Management on
Erie’s behalf.  Once it was determined that Erie was in violation of a number of
regulations, Mariano used his influence to help postpone for several years potentially
costly corrective measures that were necessary for Erie to comply with the applicable
regulations.
The second payment occurred on or about August 26, 2002.  Prior to this payment
being made, outside accountants had discovered and questioned the circumstances
surrounding the May 10, 2002 check from Erie to Fleet Credit Card Services.  When
Philip Chartock told the outside accountants that the check was for the payment of a
politician’s debt, the accountants told Philip Chartock that the payment should be
classified as a loan, not a sales expense.  To avoid further scrutiny, this second payment
was not made directly to Mariano’s credit card company, but rather was channeled
through several intermediaries.  
First, an Erie check in the amount of $6,672.00 was written and made payable to
1 Rosalia Mattioni and Joseph Pellecchia owned and operated Danlin Management
Group.  Danlin Management Group received favorable treatment from Mariano following
its actions with respect to this second payment.
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William Burns.  This check was falsely classified as a cleanup and removal expense. 
Rosalia Mattioni, who shared a joint account with William Burns, was given the Erie
check by her husband Joseph Pellecchia1 following a meeting between Mariano and
Pellecchia.  Rosalia Mattioni deposited this Erie check into the joint account and obtained
a cashier’s check in the amount of $6,672.00 made payable to AT&T Universal Card, in
accordance with Joseph Pellecchia’s instructions.  A fake invoice was then sent by
Mattioni to Erie.  This check was used to pay the personal credit card bills of Mariano.
At around the time of this second payment, Philip Chartock was seeking Mariano’s
assistance in obtaining tax relief for Erie through a program known as Keystone
Opportunity Zone (“KOZ”).  On November 13, 2002, a meeting was organized at
Mariano’s office involving Mariano, Philip Chartock, and Keystone Opportunity Zone
Administrator Vincent Dougherty, among others.  At this meeting, Dougherty explained
that Erie did not meet the criteria for the tax relief.  Despite Dougherty’s explanation that
Erie did not qualify for relief, the Chartocks continued to seek inclusion in the KOZ
program, and on November 25, 2002, Louis Chartock asked Mariano to introduce
legislation making Erie eligible for tax relief.
Shortly after this request, on or about December 6, 2002, Philip Chartock made the
third payment.  Like the second payment, this payment was also channeled through an
2 Recon International received favorable treatment from Mariano following its
actions with respect to this third payment.
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intermediary rather than being made payable directly to Mariano’s credit card company. 
An Erie check in the amount of $10,900.00 was written and made payable to Recon
International,2 a company owned by co-defendant Vincent DiPentino.  This payment was
improperly classified as a freight, equipment, and rental expense by Erie, and DiPentino
sent a fake invoice to Philip Chartock.  DiPentino deposited this check into his personal
account and wrote a check in the amount of $10,900.00 made payable to Capital One to
pay Mariano’s personal debts.  
After these payments were made, Mariano continued to recommend that Erie be
included in new KOZ tax relief legislation.  In April 2003, Erie was included in a
proposed KOZ tax relief bill introduced into City Council.  In May 2003, Mariano voted
twice in favor of the KOZ tax relief bill, and the bill ultimately became law.  During
neither affirmative vote did Mariano disclose his financial relationship with Erie or recuse
himself from the voting, as required by law.  Mariano also failed to include the payments
from Erie on the State and City financial disclosure forms, as required by law.
Even after being included in the KOZ tax relief legislation, Philip Chartock and his
father continued to seek additional favors from Mariano.  These requested favors included
assistance with energy rate reductions from PECO, resolution of outstanding tax issues,
removal of a judgment against Erie, and rate reductions from the Pennsylvania Workers’
Compensation Rating Bureau.
6The alleged honest services fraud scheme became public when Maggie Greer, the
Erie bookkeeper who had helped handle the payments to Mariano and was herself later
charged with embezzling money from Erie, wrote an anonymous letter dated April 30,
2004 to the City Council President and the Mayor detailing the Mariano-Chartock honest
services fraud scheme.  Mariano immediately learned of this letter from the City Council
President, and told his Chief of Staff, Walter DeTreux, that the first payment to his credit
card was a loan and that it had been repaid.  Other steps were also taken by Philip and
Louis Chartock to disguise the payments as loans.  In May 2004, while meeting with
Assistant District Attorney Steven Hyman regarding the embezzlement case against
Maggie Greer, Philip Chartock told Hyman that he had loaned money to Mariano, that
Mariano repaid the loan, and that he could likely locate a receipt.  Following this meeting,
a fake receipt dated May 3, 2004 was created, and the receipt bore Philip Chartock’s
signature.  
On March 30, 2005, Philip Chartock told FBI Agent Raymond Manna that the
check written to Fleet Credit Card Services (the first payment) was a loan and that
Mariano repaid the loan, but he told Agent Manna that there were no loan documents. 
With respect to the checks related to the second and third payments (to William Burns
and Recon International, respectively), Philip Chartock told Agent Manna that he signed
the checks, but stated that he knew nothing about the checks.  Finally, although Philip
Chartock admitted to Agent Manna that Mariano had helped Erie with various issues,
Philip Chartock never mentioned Mariano’s help with the KOZ tax relief legislation.
7On October 25, 2005, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned
a 26-count indictment naming Philadelphia City Councilman Richard Mariano and five
co-defendants, including Philip Chartock.  Philip Chartock was charged in eleven counts. 
Count 1 charged Philip and Louis Chartock, among others, with conspiracy to commit
honest services mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Counts 2 through 8 charged
Philip Chartock (together with Louis Chartock in Counts 3 and 8) with aiding and
abetting honest services mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341, and 1346.  Count
14 charged Philip and Louis Chartock with aiding and abetting honest services wire fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343, and 1346.  Counts 18 and 19 charged Philip
Chartock with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1956(a)(1)(B)(I).
In pretrial motions, Philip Chartock moved to dismiss the indictment, contending
that the honest services fraud charges were unconstitutionally vague and that the money
laundering charges did not involve the proceeds of illegal activity.  The District Court
denied these motions to dismiss the indictment.  The case then proceeded to trial on April
24, 2007.  On May 8, 2007, the jury found Philip Chartock guilty of conspiracy to commit
honest services fraud (Count 1), aiding and abetting honest services mail fraud (Counts 2,
3, 4, 5, and 6), aiding and abetting honest services wire fraud (Count 14), and money
laundering (Counts 18 and 19).  The jury found Philip Chartock not guilty on one count
of aiding and abetting honest services mail fraud (Count 8), and the Government
successfully moved to dismiss one of the honest services mail fraud charges (Count 7).  In
response to specific jury interrogatories requested by Philip Chartock, the jury found
3 These theories of guilt for honest services fraud are more fully described herein.
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Philip Chartock guilty under both the bribery and failure to disclose theories3 on Counts
2, 3, 4, and 14, and found Philip Chartock guilty of Counts 5 and 6 only under the failure
to disclose theory.
Philip Chartock filed a post-trial motion seeking judgment of acquittal or a new
trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the honest services fraud and
money laundering convictions.  Philip Chartock also challenged the District Court’s jury
instruction concerning the meaning of “on or about” as used in the indictment.  On March
1, 2007, the District Court denied the post-trial motions.
After a sentencing hearing on March 19, 2007, the District Court sentenced Philip
Chartock to a term of imprisonment of 40 months, a term of supervised release of two
years, a fine of $25,000, and a special assessment of $900.  Chartock filed a timely notice
of appeal.
II.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had
subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III.
A. Honest Services Fraud - Failure to Disclose Theory
Honest services fraud can be proven in two ways: “(1) bribery, where a legislator
4 In this opinion, when the word “Chartock” is used alone, the word refers to Philip
Chartock.
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was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a conflict of interest
resulting in personal gain.”  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001). 
The Government concedes that “to convict a private citizen, such as Chartock, of the
failure to disclose a conflict of interest theory of honest services fraud, the government
must introduce sufficient evidence to prove that the private citizen was aware that the
public official was required to disclose their relationship and that the private citizen
knowingly assisted the public official in the failure to disclose.”  Gov’t Br. at 38. 
Chartock4 argues before this Court that: (1) the indictment failed to include in each count
an allegation that he had knowledge of Mariano’s disclosure requirements; (2) the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed such knowledge; and (3) the District
Court failed to instruct the jury that it could not convict him unless he possessed such
knowledge.  These arguments will each be dealt with separately below.
1. Sufficiency of Indictment
A claim that the indictment failed to properly plead honest services fraud
violations is a legal question subject to plenary review.  United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d
257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  An indictment is considered sufficient if it: “‘(1) contains the
elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of
what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to
what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent
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prosecution.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
“‘[N]o greater specificity than the statutory language is required so long as there is
sufficient factual orientation to permit the defendant to prepare his defense and to invoke
double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent prosecution.’”  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280
(quoting United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1989)).
With respect to the conspiracy count (Count 1) of the indictment, this Court has
stated that “[a]n indictment charging a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 need not
specifically plead all of the elements of the underlying substantive offense.”  United
States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Wong Tai v. United States,
273 U.S. 77, 81 (1927) (“[I]t is not necessary to allege with technical precision all the
elements essential to the commission of the offense which is the object of the
conspiracy.”).  Rather, the indictment simply must “put defendants on notice that they are
being charged with a conspiracy to commit the underlying substantive offense.”  Werme,
939 F.2d at 112.  Here, the indictment charged Chartock specifically with conspiring to
defraud the City of Philadelphia of Mariano’s honest services, and the indictment later
alleged that Mariano failed to disclose the payments made by Chartock in violation of
local and state laws.  App. at 108-09.  Although the indictment did not specifically allege
that Chartock knew of Mariano’s duty to disclose, the indictment nonetheless sufficiently
pleaded an honest services fraud conspiracy.
With respect to the honest services mail/wire fraud counts and the money
laundering counts, it should first be noted that these counts incorporate many of the
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paragraphs from Count 1, including the paragraph describing Mariano’s failure to
disclose the payments.  See, e.g., App. at 132 (Count 18).  Then, at the end of each count,
the indictment specifically stated that one of the statutes violated by Chartock was 18
U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute.  Because “aiding and abetting” requires proof
that the “‘defendant knew of the crime and attempted to facilitate it,’” United States v.
Cunningham, 517 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d
99, 113 (3d Cir. 1999)), the honest services mail/wire fraud and money laundering counts
sufficiently pleaded the necessary element that Chartock knew of Mariano’s disclosure
requirement and knowingly assisted in Mariano’s evasion of the requirement.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence
Chartock next argues that the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find
that he knew of Mariano’s duty to disclose and that he knowingly assisted in Mariano’s
failure to disclose.  This Court must review the record de novo to ensure that the jury’s
verdict is supported by substantial evidence.  United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 166
(3d Cir. 2005).  In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by sufficient
evidence, this Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and sustain the verdict if any rational juror could have found the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v.Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 175 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Chartock notes, and the Government concedes, that there was no direct evidence
proving that Chartock knew of Mariano’s duty to disclose.  “In the absence of direct
5 Chartock cites to United States v. Carbo, 2007 WL 2323126, *22-29 (E.D. Pa.
2007), for the proposition that although the circumstantial evidence of concealment was
sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that Chartock knew he was involved in some type of
illegality, the evidence does not support an inference that Chartock knew of Mariano’s
duty to disclose the payments.  However, because this Court questions the correctness of
the holding in Carbo, this Court is not persuaded by this District Court opinion.
12
evidence, however, the requisite knowledge and intent can be demonstrated
circumstantially, and where sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented, a jury may
properly infer that the defendants were culpably involved with, and knowingly furthered,
the fraudulent scheme.”  United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 541 (3d Cir. 1978)
(internal citations omitted) (in the context of a mail fraud scheme).  The Government’s
circumstantial evidence that Chartock concealed payments to Mariano by repeatedly
making payments either directly to Mariano’s credit card companies or by using a third
party intermediary is powerful evidence that Chartock knew of Mariano’s disclosure
duties.  In addition, Chartock devised a scheme to cover up the payments by falsely
claiming that the payments were loans and then falsely claiming that the loans had been
paid off.  The jury certainly acted reasonably in drawing the inference that these efforts at
concealment demonstrated that Chartock knew about Mariano’s disclosure requirements
and that Chartock was knowingly assisting Mariano in the avoidance of these
requirements.5
Chartock also argues that the efforts at concealment are just as consistent, if not
more consistent, with the theory that Chartock sought to disguise the payments as
deductible business expenses for tax purposes.  However, this Court has stated that
6 At oral argument, the Government argued that because Chartock failed to object
after the delivery of the charge, review is for plain error.  See United States v. Pelullo,
399 F.3d 197, 221 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because we find no error in the jury instructions, using
the plain error standard instead of the plenary standard would not affect our analysis.
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“[t]here is no requirement . . . that the inference drawn by the jury be the only inference
possible or that the government’s evidence forecloses every possible innocent
explanation.”  United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 97 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992).  The jury was
clearly justified in rejecting this alternative explanation of the evidence, and the evidence
clearly supported the jury’s finding that Chartock knew of Mariano’s disclosure
requirement and knowingly assisted in Mariano’s evasion of that requirement.
3. Jury Instructions
Finally, Chartock argues that the District Court’s jury instructions were legally
erroneous because the District Court failed to instruct the jury that he could not be found
guilty unless the jury found that he knew of Mariano’s duty to disclose the payments from
Erie and that he knowingly aided Mariano’s failure to disclose.  Additionally, Chartock
argues that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to give his requested
instruction.
This Court exercises plenary review6 in determining “‘whether the jury
instructions stated the proper legal standard.’”  United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 642
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995)).  In
making this determination, we must “consider the totality of the instructions and not a
particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.”  Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1245.  This Court
7 The District Court also properly instructed the jury on the conspiracy count
(Count 1).
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reviews the refusal to give a requested instruction for abuse of discretion.  Leahy, 445
F.3d at 642.
The jury instruction regarding honest services fraud adequately defined the
requirement that Chartock know of the disclosure requirements and aid Mariano in his
avoidance of those requirements.7  The District Court stated “the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Councilman Mariano received a benefit which he was
required to disclose under state or local law which he failed to disclose, or that he acted
under a conflict of interest which he was required to disclose but did not disclose, and that
the defendant, one or both, aided and abetted the public official.”  App. at 1566.  The
District Court later clarified the requirements for “aiding and abetting” as follows:
In order to be found guilty of aiding and abetting the
commission of a crime, the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant first knew that the crime charged
was to be committed or was being committed.  Second, that the
defendant knowingly did some act for the purpose of aiding the
commission of that crime.  And third, acted with the intention of
causing the crime charged to be committed.
App. at 1577.  
Viewing these two components of the jury instructions together, this Court
concludes that the jury was properly instructed of the requirement of finding that
Chartock knew of Mariano’s disclosure requirement and assisted in the evasion of that
requirement.  Because the actual jury instruction properly stated the law, any refusal by
15
the District Court to give a requested instruction was not an abuse of discretion.  See
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) (discretion only abused if
requested instruction is “not substantially covered by other instructions”).
B. “Stream of Benefits” Instruction
Chartock also argues that the District Court’s “stream of benefits” instruction on
the issue of bribery was erroneous.  This Court exercises plenary review in determining
“‘whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard.’”  Leahy, 445 F.3d at 642
(quoting Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1245).  The District Court, in part, instructed the jury that “[i]f
you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a person gave an official a stream of benefits in
implicit exchange for one or more official acts, you may conclude that a bribery has
occurred.”  App. at 1564.  As Chartock acknowledges, this Court recently approved of
almost identical language in an honest services bribery case, and Chartock simply raises
this issue to preserve it for review.  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 281-82, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1329 (February 19, 2008).  Consistent with this Court’s precedent, we conclude that the
District Court committed no error in giving this “stream of benefits” instruction.
C. Money Laundering Convictions
To establish a money laundering offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), the
government must plead and prove: “(1) an actual or attempted financial transaction; (2)
involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (3) knowledge that the transaction
involves the proceeds of some unlawful activity; and (4) . . . knowledge that the
transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source,
8  Chartock additionally argues that the evidence was insufficient because of the
failures of the indictment and that the jury instructions repeated the errors made in the
indictment.  Because this Court concludes that the indictment properly charged the money
laundering offenses, this Court need not reach these related arguments.
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ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”  United States v.
Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2001).  Chartock makes two separate arguments
regarding the insufficiency of the indictment, and they will be addressed separately
below.8  As before, a claim that the indictment failed to properly plead the offense
charged is subject to plenary review.  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280.
1. “Proceeds” Argument
Chartock first argues that the financial transaction alleged in the indictment did not
involve the “proceeds” of the specified unlawful activity.  Chartock notes that the money
laundering counts, Counts 18 and 19, explicitly state that the “proceeds” for purposes of
the statute were from the unlawful activities charged in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment,
respectively.  Chartock also notes that Counts 3 and 4 are based upon the mailings of the
checks from the third parties to Mariano’s credit card companies.  Chartock argues that
because the mail fraud offenses are not complete until the mailings occur, and because the
financial transactions constituting the “laundering” alleged in the indictment occurred
before the mailings, the indictment failed to properly plead that the financial transactions
involved “the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
This Court has stated that “for money to become ‘proceeds’ it must be derived
from a completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense.”  Omoruyi, 260
9 Additionally, Counts 18 and 19 incorporate many of the paragraphs from the
conspiracy to commit honest services fraud charged in Count 1.  App. at 132, 134.
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F.3d at 295 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 980 (3d Cir.
1994).  A mail fraud offense is not completed until the mails are used, and thus the
indictment in this case is only legally sufficient if the financial transactions alleged in the
indictment were performed with the proceeds of a “completed phase of an ongoing
offense.”  Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 295-96.  Chartock cites to two cases for the proposition
that mail fraud is not an “ongoing offense,” but these cases both involved the question of
which Sentencing Guidelines Manual should be used based on a mail fraud conviction
that occurred on a date prior to the change in a particular sentencing guideline, and thus
these cases are not controlling.  See United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, 1108 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1995); United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1424-25 (3d Cir. 1992).
In this case, the initial writing of the check and the presentation of the check to
Mariano constituted the “completed phase” of the ongoing offense of honest services mail
fraud.  Chartock argues that because the indictment charged a specific count of honest
services mail fraud, and not an ongoing mail fraud scheme, the indictment did not plead
an ongoing offense.  However, mail fraud, by its statutory definition and as interpreted by
this Court, includes the element of Chartock’s “knowing and willful participation in a
scheme or artifice to defraud.”9  Antico, 275 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added).  Although the
offense of mail fraud is not complete until the use of the mails in furtherance of the
scheme or artifice to defraud, the scheme is often in place and actions are often taken in
10 Chartock does not contest whether the other requirements of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(c)(4) were met.
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furtherance of the scheme prior to the use of the mails that gives rise to federal
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  See United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566
(10th Cir. 1995) (“‘[S]cheme to defraud’ has a larger meaning than an individual act of
fraud.”); see also United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2043 (2008) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he unlawful activity in mail fraud . . . is the scheme to defraud, not the
individual mailings carried out in furtherance of the scheme.”).  Because the scheme to
defraud was at a “completed phase of an ongoing offense” prior to the specific financial
transactions charged in Counts 18 and 19, the indictment properly charged money
laundering.
2. “Financial Transaction” Argument
Chartock also argues that Count 19 is flawed in a separate manner because of its
inclusion of “the writing of a personal check” as one of the “transactions” coming under
the money laundering statute.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, money laundering must involve a
“financial transaction,” which is a “transaction” (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3))
that meets the requirements of § 1956(c)(4).10  The term “transaction” is defined to
include a “purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition.”  18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3).  The definition of “transaction” under the money laundering statute
is “very broad” and for that reason at least one Court of Appeals has stated that “[w]riting
a check drawn on an account maintained [in a financial institution the activities of which
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affect interstate commerce] is . . . a ‘transaction.’” United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832,
841 (7th Cir. 1991).  This Court agrees that the term “transaction” includes the writing of
a check, and therefore the indictment properly charged the offense of money laundering
in Count 19. 
D. “On or About” Instruction
Chartock finally argues that the District Court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the
government had to prove that an overt act was committed on the specific date charged in
the indictment prejudiced Chartock’s defense.  The District Court instructed the jury on
the meaning of the phrase “on or about,” as used in the indictment, as follows: “[T]he
proof need not establish with certainty the exact date of any alleged offense.  It is
sufficient if the evidence in the case established beyond a reasonable doubt that an
offense was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged.”  App. at 1693. 
Chartock argues that this instruction was prejudicial to his defense because with respect
to the second payment, Chartock introduced evidence that called into question Maggie
Greer’s testimony regarding the dates of the events comprising the second payment. 
As stated previously, this Court must exercise plenary review in determining
“‘whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard.’”  Leahy, 445 F.3d at 642
(quoting Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1245).  This Court reviews the refusal to give a requested
instruction for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 643.  Chartock concedes that generally the
government only needs to prove that an overt act occurred “on or about” a certain date. 
However, Chartock argues that this Court has developed a line of cases creating an
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exception to this general rule whenever the exact date has unique importance in that case. 
See, e.g., United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1999) (remanding on
basis that “on or about” cannot be used to extend commencement date of conspiracy
backwards to add to restitution); United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 245 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding that “on or about” cannot be used where variation from date specified
in indictment would affect whether two counts are multiplicitous).  These cases cited by
Chartock have no applicability in this situation, where Chartock was simply trying to
undermine the credibility of a witness, and where neither the jury instructions nor the
District Court prevented Chartock from making such an argument.
Because the “on or about” instruction was legally correct and because the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an alternative instruction, this Court
concludes that the District Court committed no error in giving the “on or about”
instruction.
IV.
We have considered all other arguments made by the parties on appeal, and
conclude that no further discussion is necessary.  For the above reasons, the conviction
and sentence of the District Court will be affirmed.
